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ABSTRACT 
All decisions involve risk; yet the subject is poorly understood and difficult to define. 
Understanding risk is vital for military leaders that prepare their forces to operate in risky 
environments against adversaries that seek to impose risk upon their enemies. 
Furthermore, the decisions of military leaders affect those subordinates under their 
command and ultimately the will of the nation that has sent them abroad. It is paramount, 
therefore, that we utilize a decision process to reveal how emotions can affect our 
judgment. Frequently, cultural forces in the military can result in ill-informed and 
emotionally biased decisions that are an irresponsible execution of duty. We address this 
problem by defining the objective components of risk using mathematical concepts then 
characterizing the nature of risk in different military environments using those concepts. 
Our approach uses economic principles, game theory, and decision theory to illustrate 
how calculations of risk should influence decision-making.  Objectively defining risk will 
aid in revealing the subjective components of risk, where the mathematical principles 
explain both how decisions are effectively made and how to make decisions effectively. 
Risk in training and risk in combat pose two very different problems; but to be fully 
understood both environments must be viewed together. This detailed analysis and 
research aims to create a more informed decision making process and a more 
sophisticated decision maker.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As former infantry company commanders we both previously thought we 
understood risk. After all, we routinely made assessments of risk as part of our duty in 
either training or combat. In our discussion of the topic we realized something 
remarkable, namely that two commanders, with the same job and the same training can 
produce two very different assessments of risk for the same event. On top of those 
different assessments there are additional reactions to the assessments that make risk a 
topic worth studying. First, in our experience the assessments are almost always 
universally accepted. Second, risk assessments in military training and combat 
environments usually deal with risking soldiers’ lives, or risking accomplishing a very 
important mission.   
Most military leaders understand risk as something to be avoided by filling out a 
worksheet. The Army uses the Composite Risk Management Worksheet (CRMW) that 
involves listing hazards that would possibly occur during a training event or a combat 
mission as well as an assessment of the frequency of each hazard. Because of the 
occasional “pencil whip” approach to the worksheet that is widely viewed as career-
insurance in the event of an accident we both agreed that a rigorous approach to the topic 
of risk was a journey worth taking. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Since the current military approach to risk involves little training or concrete 
understanding, our methodology is rigorous. We begin in the basic mathematical 
principles of dispersion, variance, range, and expected value to define risk in its most 
simple and concrete form. To deepen the definition, we include classic game theory to 
illustrate risk in an environment where adversaries impose risk on one another. With this 
baseline understanding we utilize the basic economic principle of supply and demand to 
illustrate the relationship between training and combat risk, two environments that we 
find are separate but best calculated together. Finally, decision theory and game theory 
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together illustrate the inherently complex and risky environment of combat. Our 
illustration is abstract but is supported by several practical examples of how to assess and 
measure risk in decision-making. 
For us, the topic of risk is not only interesting for our thesis, but is vital to us as 
leaders in the military. If the status quo is to only make sure a worksheet is properly filled 
out instead of applying thought to a rigorous decision process, then we become part of a 
continuous cycle of leadership failures. This work aims to end that cycle. 
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II. RISK FRAMEWORK 
A. RISK WITH ONE DECISION MAKER 
The mathematical concept of expected value, the product of value and probability, 
is the basis for objectively defining risk. Expected value is the value of an event, based on 
the probability it will occur over many trials. In each calculation there may be a vast 
difference in outcomes, but when you average many trials together they reveal a specific 
value that one can legitimately guarantee. 
A simple way to understand expected value is using the popular game show “Deal 
or No Deal.”1 In this game a player selects a suitcase from a set of suitcases that contain 
varying amounts of money. Which suitcase contains which amount of money is 
unknown. Furthermore, a banker knows the values contained in each suitcase and can 
offer an alternative amount of money for the player, before the player opens the selected 
suitcase revealing his prize. For instance, if the player has a choice between two 
suitcases, knowing that one suitcase contains $100 and the other suitcase contains $0 he 
can determine the probability of selecting each value is 50% or .5. Using expected value 
he determines the value of the game is $50. The equation for the expected value of this 
game is:  E(X) = $100(.5) + $0(.5) = $50. If the banker offers the player $40 before the 
player opens his selected suitcase, the player can make $100, $40, or zero dollars 
depending on his choice.  
As the player faces his choice, it is important to understand what he is risking. 
First, his choice is either to take $40 or to select a suitcase. If he selects a suitcase he 
could gain the benefit of $100 or gain $0. Therefore, he is risking the guarantee of $40 
when he chooses to select a suitcase because of the equal probability of either $100 or $0. 
This concept illustrates how risk specifically deals with potential cost. In his book An 
Anatomy of Risk, William Rowe defines risk as “the potential for unwanted negative 
consequences of an event or activity.”2  In this case, the negative consequence of 
                                                 
1 To play a game of  “Deal or No Deal,” see http://www.nbc.com/Deal_or_No_Deal/game/flash.shtml. 
2 William Rowe, An Anatomy of Risk (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977), 24. 
 4
selecting the suitcase with zero dollars is gaining no money when the banker extended his 
hand with $40. Specifically, the risk of selecting a suitcase is $40. The informed player 
understands that if he decides to select a suitcase he is equally likely to gain $100 or gain 
$0. Although he is trying to win there should be no surprise, due to the equal probability, 
if he ends up empty handed. In the same way, when making decisions in risky 
environments the informed decision maker should be aware of the probabilities of the 
outcomes, and if the decision rests on a 50/50 shot, the negative consequence should be 
equally expected as the positive benefit. 
Seemingly, the simple choice would be to always select a suitcase, for the 
expected return is $50, which is more money than the banker is offering. However, it is 
important to highlight the use of many trials compared to a one-time decision when using 
expected value. If the player played this game 100 times, he will average $50 over many 
trials. The player might select the suitcase with $0 two times in a row. On the third game, 
if he selects the suitcase with $100, he would make an average of $33.3 per game, which 
is not that bad considering he “lost” twice and “won” only once. If the player is only 
playing the game one time then the only concrete guarantee that he can rely on is the 
probability or chance assigned to each suitcase. In this game, it is equally probable for 
him to gain $100 or $0. The only way for him to guarantee a gain in a single trial is to 
select the $40 that the banker is offering him. The expected value of the game of $50 is 
greater than the banker’s offer of $40 when utilizing decisions with many trials. 
Using many trials to formulate an expected value can be graphically depicted as a 
normal distribution. The expected value over many trials is the average, but each 
individual trial contributes to a dispersion, or variance, within a normal distribution. It is 
possible for each individual trial to be above or below the average, potentially creating a 
value far from what is expected. This possibility reveals Thomas Schelling’s conclusion 
that “appreciable risk” exists where success, even when all decisions are made correctly, 
may not be achieved.3  This anticipation is important in order to identify when a decision 
                                                 
3 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 203. 
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is of high risk or low risk, so the decision maker understands to anticipate possible 
outcomes before the results of his decision occur. 
B. DECISIONS OF HIGH AND LOW RISK 
When one faces a decision intended to create a specific outcome, the variance of 
possible outcomes over many trials determines the degree of risk. A large variance 
depicts the range of the average deviation from the mean resulting in an array of possible 
outcomes that may occur close to or farther away from the expected outcome. The large 
variance depicts the large amount of risk.4  Expected value is the average of outcomes 
over many trials. The mean, or average, is another term that depicts expected value. A 
story of two golfers provides an illustration to understand high and low risk in relation to 
deviation from the mean. Golfer 1 plays multiple rounds and scores between 84 and 86. 
Golfer 2 however, shoots between 70 and 100. These two golfers have the same average, 
or mean, score of 85. Their ranges are drastically different, with Golfer 1 having a range 
of 2 (86–84) and Golfer 2 a range of 30 (100–70). Although they have the same mean, 
Golfer 2 is a riskier player. On any given day, Golfer 2 has the potential of shooting 
under par, but with this potential gain comes the potential cost of shooting in the triple 
digits.   
Another example of this dynamic is the known variance of indirect fire weapons. 
Comparing two commonly known systems, the 81mm mortar and naval gunfire, shows 
that when an observer calls for fire on a particular target, one system is more accurate, or 
less risky, than the other. Greater accuracy determines that the round will likely land 
within a certain distance of an identified target. The system with lower variance, a 81mm 
mortar, exemplifies the “less risky” decision. While naval gunfire is a larger caliber 
round, the accuracy of this system is less than the 81mm mortar so it portrays a “high 
risk” in missing the target. Figure 1 depicts normal distributions with different variances. 
                                                 
4 James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen (New York: The Free 
Press, 1994), 7. 
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Figure 1.   Normal Distribution of Two Indirect Fire Systems with Different 
Variances5 
The “flatter” solid curve in Figure 1 depicts a decision with high variance. The 
“taller” dashed curve depicts a decision with low variance. Application of the idea of 
variance to a decision reveals that different situations or different decision makers can 
determine whether a decision is of high risk or low risk. Furthermore, while many believe 
that the results of a decision are often the best indicator of whether the decision was 
‘good’ or ‘bad’, it is possible to have a good decision with a bad result and also a bad 
decision with a good result.6  Uncertainty can account for an unintended result. The 
example of different indirect fire systems can help us understand how uncertainty is 
related to decisions concerning risk. 
                                                 
5 This graph is meant to simply depict the differences in accuracy of the two weapons systems and 
does not reflect specific number values. 












Figure 2.   Depiction of More Accurate System with Less Accurate Result in One-Trial 
Figure 2 depicts two rounds of indirect fire that impacted near the intended target. 
Unexpectedly, the naval gunfire round landed closer to the target than the 81 mm round. 
The risky decision, depicted by naval gunfire, ended up with a better result than the less 
risky decision, depicted by the 81 mm mortar. While both rounds landed in the area that 
they would be reasonably expected to land, over many trials one would not expect the 
naval gunfire to be more accurate than the 81 mm mortar. Leaders must not narrowly 
assume the results are the primary indicator of a good decision. 
Adding knowledge to a decision lowers the variance, or risk, and creates a more 
informed and accurate decision.7  This principle is best illustrated by the concept of 
conditional probability.8 A story of a street magician and four friends reveals how 
knowledge can change the odds, or probability, in favor of the decision maker. A 
magician walks up to four friends on the street and asks if they can guess what card out of 
a standard 52-card deck he just flipped over. The first guy was taken off guard and has no 
indication of what the card is, but only knows that his odds in guessing it are 1/52. The 
                                                 
7 Rushworth M. Kidder, How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical 
Living (New York: Harper, 2003), 112. 
8 Donald P. Gaver and Gerald L. Thompson, Programming and Probability Models in Operations 
Research (Blemont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1973), 290. 
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second friend happened to catch a glimpse of the card as it was flipped and saw that it 
was black making his odds of guessing correctly 1/26. The third friend was paying a bit 
closer attention and saw that the card was in fact a spade, and he is tempted to guess 
knowing that his odds are 1/13. The last friend had bent down to tie his shoe and could 
see the corner of the card underneath as the magician pulled it from the deck, determining 
that it was an ace of unknown suit and color, giving him the best odds of 1/4. This story 
shows how independently each friend achieved a different level of information. 
Independently, they all had varying degrees of probability in guessing the correct card. 
Even more interesting is that if they pooled all their information together, and talked 
about what they saw, they know with absolute certainty that the magician pulled the Ace 
of Spades from the deck. Adding knowledge to any decision will increase the probability 
of making the right call.   
Making the right call is as much about properly using the information available as 
it is about the timing of the decision. There is risk in executing with incomplete 
information, but there is also risk in attaining more information. Determining whether the 
risk of gaining more information adds enough cost to outweigh the cost of executing the 
mission without the information is a common challenge. The Army FM 6–0 Mission 
Command states, “The art of command includes deciding when to make decisions versus 
waiting for more information.”9 This statement in military doctrine poses difficult 
problems for commanders and requires further analysis.   
Going deeper into the relationship between time and information reveals the close 
ties these variables have with risk decisions. First, it is possible to make the right call too 
late or too early, where a good decision at the wrong time becomes the wrong decision. 
Second, information decreases risk yet there is a point where waiting, possibly for more 
information, actually increases risk.10 The dynamic between information, time, and risk is 
paradoxical because delaying a decision to gain more information with the intent of 
making a better decision can increase risk where “attempting to lower risks actually 
                                                 
9 U.S. Army, Field Manual 6–0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces 
(Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, August 2003), 2–17. 
10 Bruce R. Kingma, The Economics of Information: A Guide to Economic and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
for Information Professionals Second Edition (Englewood, CO: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 2001), 89. 
 9
raises them or, alternatively, displaces them on to other objects.”11  Third, an increase in 
risk is the result of the delay of decision not the result of too much information. More 
information increases knowledge that reduces risk when used properly. These problems 
are best avoided by understanding that the optimal time to decide is when the marginal 
cost of information equals the marginal return for that information.12 While it is 
impossible to know the optimal point of the amount of information concerning the timing 
of a decision, knowing the dynamics of time and information will aid leaders in weighing 
risk in the process of decision-making. 
The process of decision-making when objectively weighing risks is understood 
using expected value and dispersion. These mathematical principles address natural risks 
that are universally present in an environment. The concept of game theory will illustrate 
risk with two competing decision makers, as with two commanders in armed conflict. 
C. RISK WITH TWO COMPETING DECISION MAKERS 
Game theory provides an abstract method to study how two competing decision-
makers impose risk on each other and how each player tries to maximize their own 
outcome. In each game, the decisions of each player involve some degree of risk. 
The classic game of Chicken, where two opposing players choose whether to stay 
the dangerous collision course or veer aside, provides an example of how risk is imposed 
by competing adversaries, essentially an attack or not attack situation. The possible 
outcomes of each player’s decision yield varying degrees of preferred results for each 
player. 
1. The Game 
The set-up of the game identifies how the options for each player interact with the 
other and how each action can impose risk on the opposing player. Figure 3 illustrates, 
with the use of letters, how each strategy combines to produce a result. 
                                                 
11 Aaron Wildavsky, “No Risk is the Highest Risk of All,” in Readings in Risk, eds. Theodore S. 
Glickman and Michael Gough, 120–128 (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1990), 122. 
12 Kingma, The Economics of Information, 147–148. 
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Figure 3.   Player 1 vs. Player 2 in the Game of Chicken 
There are four possible results: 
 AC – Player 1 Attacks; Player 2 Attacks 
 AD – Player 1 Attacks; Player 2 Does Not Attack 
 BC – Player 1 Does Not Attack; Player 2 Attacks 
 BD – Player 1 Does Not Attack; Player 2 Does Not Attack 
Understanding how the “game” is played is important in order to move to the next 
step of ranking the options available to Player 1 and Player 2. An assumption in this 
“game” is that both players are attempting to maximize their individual payoff. For the 
purpose of this “game”, the rank order for Player 1 and Player 2 are in Tables 1 and 2. 
Ranking the options is necessary in order to illustrate the desired outcome of each player. 
The classic game of Chicken is a partial conflict game in which each player has the same 
options, but both players rank their options opposite of one another.     
 11
 
Table 1.   Options Available to the Player 1 Ranked from Best to Worst (4 to 1). 
 
Table 2.   Options Available to Player 2 Ranked from Best to Worst (4 to 1). 
Based on the rankings of the options listed above in Tables 1 and 2, the “game” 




Figure 4.   Player 1 vs. Player 2 
Figure 4 illustrates the most likely outcome without Player 1 and Player 2 
communicating with one another. The arrows, (Player 1 – Blue and Player 2 – Green), 
indicate the direction each side would shift based on their opponent’s move/policy. 
Neither player has a dominant strategy, meaning both will change their positions based 
on the decision of the other. The Nash Equilibrium is a point at which no player can 
benefit by departing unilaterally (by itself) from its strategy associated with an 
outcome.13 As a result of the expected payoffs, it is determined that a Nash Equilibrium 
exists at both (2 , 4)—Player 1 does not attack and Player 2 attacks, as well as (4 , 2)— 
Player 1 attacks and Player 2 does not attack. This point is where each player is stable 
because he cannot improve, but the player with an outcome of 2 is not satisfied because 
he has not reached his greatest outcome. The players will now explore other options. 
                                                 
13 Garfunkel, Solomon et al., “Game Theory: The Mathematics of Competition,” in For All Practical 
Purposes: Introduction To Contemporary Mathematics, Fourth Edition, 15, (New York: W.H. Freeman 
and Company, 1988), 582.  
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Figure 5.   Player 1 vs. Player 2 Maximin 
Other options include seeking the maximum value of minimal results. This 
maximin is determined by selecting the lowest possible outcome between each player’s 
strategies (A , B) and (C , D), as depicted in Figure 5. The highest value is selected as the 
best possible outcome between the lowest set of values. Notice that if each player is 
playing conservatively (maximin) without communication, it is in the best interest of 
each player to not attack (3, 3). Next, the strategic moves each player should consider 
illustrates how each player can manipulate his opponent in order to maximize his own 
outcome.  
2. Strategic Moves 
Identifying some facts about the classic game of Chicken aid in the analysis of 
strategic moves. Based on the outcome in Figure 5, a dominant strategy does not exist for 
either player, a Nash Equilibrium occurs at (2, 4)  and (4, 2) during a pure strategy game, 
and the likely outcome without communication would be (3, 3). 
Opening communication between Player 1 and Player 2 can determine if Player 1 
can benefit from a first move.   
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Should Player 1 move first:  
If Player 1 does A, then Player 2 does D, implies outcome (4, 2) 
If Player 1 does B, then Player 2 does C, implies outcome (2, 4) 
So Player 1 would choose outcome (4, 2), the better option from their perspective. 
Should Player 1 force Player 2 to move first: 
If Player 2 does C, then Player 1 does B, implies (2, 4) 
If Player 2 does D, then Player 1 does B, implies (4, 2 ) 
So Player 2 would choose (2, 4), the better option from their perspective. 
Player 1 moving first would result in outcome (4, 2), and forcing Player 2 to move 
first would result in outcome (2, 4). Essentially, Player 1 and Player 2 have a first move 
that would benefit them individually better than the likely outcome without 
communication.   
In addition to a first move it is important to know if either player has the ability to 
issue a threat. Threats in the ‘game’, communicate one player’s willingness to impose 
risk on the other. Suppose the Player 1 wants Player 2 to play D. If Player 2 does C and 
Player 1 does the opposite of what they should logically do in order to hurt himself, then 
Player 1 will do A, with outcome (1, 1). Determining that this move also hurts Player 2 
reveals that the threat is valid and eliminates an outcome. Player 1 can get Player 2 to 
choose D with a threat.   
To continue the competition beyond threats, determining if Player 1 can issue a 
promise will further expand his ability to manipulate the opposing player. Promises in the 
‘game’ are one player communicating how the other player can avoid a risk. Suppose 
Player 1 wants Player 2 to play D. If Player 2 does D and Player 1 hurts himself by doing 
B, the resulting outcome would be (3, 3). Since this helps Player 2, Player 1 can get 
Player 2 to choose D with a promise. However, if both players do not promise, then this 
move will not work. Player 2 knows he could benefit from not following through with the 
promise when Player 1 keeps his promise, Player 2 would play C and achieve a (2, 4). 
Player 1 could do the same and achieve a (4, 2). If both decide to break the promise the 
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outcome would be (1, 1). For this reason the promise option does not work. In the game 
of Chicken, “both players would like to move first; in a zero-sum game both players 
would like the other player to move first.”14  
3. Prudential Security  
Since both Player 1 and Player 2 have a first move and a threat, it becomes 
important to analyze each player’s security level. The Security Level is the value of the 
game for each player when using his or her optimal strategy. The Prudential Strategy is 
the player’s optimal strategy to achieve at least their security level. In each “game”, the 
objective is for the player whose game is being analyzed to maximize his outcome while 
his opponent attempts to minimize the other player’s outcome. The result determines a 
security value for each player.  
 
Figure 6.   Player 1 Security Level 
Figure 6 depicts the results of Player 1’s “game” when played alone. Player 1 is 
attempting to maximize his outcome, while Player 2 is minimizing Player 1. The 
prudential strategy is B and the security level for Player 1 is 2.  
                                                 
14 Philip D. Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy (Beloit College: The Mathematical Association of 
America, 2002), 86. 
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Figure 7.   The Player 2 Security Level 
Figure 7 shows the results of Player 2’s “game” when played alone. Player 2 is 
attempting to maximize his outcome, while Player 1 is minimizing Player 2. The 
prudential strategy is D and the security level for Player 2 is 2.  
These two games played individually reveals that the security levels for Player 1 
and Player 2 are (2, 2), respectively. Figure 8 illustrates these two security levels when 
graphed, and demonstrates that the game is partial conflict.   
 
Figure 8.   Graphed Prudential Security 
 17
The security level reveals to each player to implement a pure strategy. This means 
Player 1 should always play ‘B’ and Player 2 should always play ‘D’ thus resulting in a 
(3, 3) outcome. The next important step to illustrate risk in this ‘game’ is to implement 
interval scaling. While both players could settle on a (3, 3), the value tied to that number 
determines the willingness of the player to risk a worse outcome to potentially gain a 
better payoff. How then does the player determine the value of the number in the game?  
Is the value the same for both players?  Determining the value and the probability of 
achieving said value is subjective to the decision maker. 
Subjective notions are important to address when thus far we have only 
determined risk in an objective manner. Expected value, dispersion, and conditional 
probability are objective aspects of risk that reveal how risk works, but only determining 
risk objectively is insufficient. Risk contains aspects of real risk and perceived risk, or 
objective and subjective components.15   The known values and probabilities in all of the 
examples thus far illustrated risk. But if the value and probabilities are unknown and the 
decision maker must determine them, here enters the subjective aspects of risk. A known 
value and probability makes weighing risk a simple task, but when subjectively assigning 
probabilities and determining values the decision maker affects the risk decision.16   
Returning to the game of “Deal or No Deal,” two players who make decisions 
differently based on what they value are playing the game. In this example, one player 
could decide that taking a chance and risking a guaranteed $40 to possibly make $100 is 
worth it. Player one is a millionaire and losing $40 is inconsequential to him, so he turns 
to the suitcases to try to make the $100. Player 2 is in a different situation for he is 
unemployed and has not eaten for three days. A guaranteed forty dollars would allow him 
to eat and survive. This simple example explains the idea of utility theory in the form of 
interval scaling. Not every decision maker is the same therefore we must acknowledge 
the subjective nature of assigning values. Interval scaling accounts for socio-cognitive 
approaches in the study of risk-decisions where the organizational environment and the 
                                                 
15 Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision Making: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 18. 
16 Martin Shubik, “Risk, Society, Politicians, Scientists, and People,” in Risk, Organizations, and 
Society, ed. Martin Shubik (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 15. 
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individual decision maker affect how a decision is made.17  Each player assigns a value 
to the outcome of the game that can determine how he makes decisions.    
4. Interval Scaling 
An interval scale will reflect the weighted preference of outcomes available to 
Player 1 and Player 2. Straffin states, “A scale on which not only the order of numbers, 
but also the ratios of differences of the numbers is meaningful is called an interval 
scale.”18  Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the numbers reflecting the individual preferences of 
Player 1 and Player 2.   
 
Figure 9.   Interval Scaling of Utilities for Player 1 Options 
The options available to Player 1 are very clear and ranked accordingly. The best 
option is awarded a ‘10’ while the least desirable option is designated a ‘1’.  
 
  
Figure 10.   Interval Scaling of Utilities for Player 2 Options 
The options available to Player 2 are also indicated utilizing the same scale, but 
the weight of each option is different than Player 1. These slight differences in how each 
player weighs the options can present a dramatic difference in the results of the game and 
the decisions made by each player in the game. 
                                                 
17 Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision Making, xii. 
18  Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 50. 
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5. Incentive and/or Negotiation 
Decisions each player makes can be determined by the values they assign to their 
outcomes. The decision to offer incentives and partake in negotiations, in the form of 
threats and promises, impose risks between the two players. As illustrated in the classic 
game of Chicken, if Player 1 threatens Player 2 to manipulate him to choose D, he does 
so with some risk that Player 2 will choose C. That risk is the potential cost of achieving 
a 1 in an attempt to achieve the benefit of a 4. In other words, the decision of Player 1 
could achieve his best or worst outcome based on the decision of the opposing player. 
This decision can be characterized as highly risky for the decision will yield either his 
best or worst outcome. Looking closely at the conservative strategy of Player 1 choosing 
not to attack, we can see how this decision is less risky because no matter what the 
opposing player chooses, Player 1 will avoid his worst outcome. Comparing the high-risk 
decision to the low-risk decision depicts the principle that greater risks tend to yield 
greater possible gain.19  In this game, the high-risk decision yields a best or worst 
outcome (1 or 4) where the less risky, or conservative strategy, yields the two middle 
outcomes (2 or 3). The purpose of the threat is to motivate Player 2 to believe that his 
best option, based on all the factors listed above, is to select the option that is actually not 
his best option but still achieves part of his desired outcome. 
6. Utilities and Risk 
Just a portion of his desired outcome may not be the player’s goal. Interval 
scaling can account for the subjectivity of the player by assigning value to his potential 
outcomes, revealing even more about risk decisions. Table 3 depicts how we apply the 
utilities of each player based on their interval scale. The players are both positioned at (3 , 
3) and weighing the benefits and risks of moving to their best outcome.  
 
 
                                                 
19 Baruch Fischhoff and John Kadvany, Risk: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 26. 
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 Outcome 4 on 
Interval Scale 
Outcome 3 on 
Interval Scale Benefit 
Player 1 10 8 10 - 8 = 2 
Player 2 10 5 10 - 5 = 5 
  
Table 3.   Utilities of Each Player Based on Interval Scaling 
Player 2 has more to benefit than Player 1 in attempting to move from outcome 3 
to outcome 4. Table 4 depicts the risk of each player where in attempting to achieve their 
best outcome of 4 there is potential that they will achieve a 1.  
 
  Outcome 1 on 
Interval Scale 
Outcome 3 on 
Interval Scale Risk 
Player 1 1 8 1 - 8 = -7 
Player 2 1 5 1 - 5 = -4 
 
Table 4.   Risk of Each Player Attempting to Achieve Their Best Outcome 
These results determine that to achieve their best outcome Player 1 will only 
benefit 2 points at the risk of 7 while Player 2 can benefit 5 points at the risk of 4.   Player 
2 has less to lose and more to benefit, therefore he is more likely to attempt to achieve his 
best outcome. Application of utilities on an interval scale depicts how different players 
will be more or less satisfied with their outcomes based on how they subjectively assign 
values to the outcomes. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Expected value, dispersion, and game theory are ways to better understand risk in 
an attempt to improve decision making processes. Identifying the decision to be made, 
determining if the decision is objective or subjective, and deciding when to make the 
decision are three portions of a decision making process derived from mathematical 
principles. Exploring the details and dynamics of risk and decisions reveals that the 
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method of decision making is not circumstantial, but the answer will be. When all 
decisions must be made absent from the knowledge of the results, knowing the variables 
that affect the decision, knowing some of the possible outcomes, and knowing how risk 
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III. RISK IN MILITARY TRAINING 
The dynamics of risk are poorly understood and no other area of military 
decision-making illustrates this more than training. The aim of this chapter is to reveal 
some aspects of risk in training, how it is different from risk in combat operations, and 
why risk in training and risk in combat should be weighed together.   
First, the primary difference between accepting risk in training from accepting 
risk in combat is the source of the risk. Namely, risk in training is natural risk, or risk that 
is inherent to the environment. Risk in combat operations includes natural risk as well as 
risk imposed by an adversary, which will be covered in Chapter IV.   
Second, planning training with the primary objective of avoiding risk, not 
mitigating risk, leads to more risk in combat. Avoiding risk increases risk because there 
“are no risk-free choices, including not to decide,” therefore avoiding risk is simply 
procrastinating instead of mitigating the risks.20  When a leader faces the unavoidable 
risks inherent in combat he will not know how to mitigate them, creating a truly risky 
situation. This added risk from avoidance is a significant factor that can degrade 
preparation of units in training when attempting to simulate the conditions of combat.   
Third, the primary focus of training is to create the capability to perform duties in 
changing operational environments. Unit and individual tasks must be executed with a 
proficiency that changes little with the added risk from an adversary in combat.   
Fourth, risk faced in training mitigates risk in combat, overtime. When a soldier 
faces and mitigates a risk in training, fully understanding the governing dynamics and 
sources of the risk instead of simply avoiding the risk through safely controlled scenarios, 
he is better prepared when faced with risks that cannot be avoided in combat. The 
economic model of supply and demand, when applied to training and combat risk, aptly 
depicts these four points. The model displays how training and combat risk are different, 
but are best weighed together. The dynamic model will illustrate examples of different 
military units with varying probabilities of going to combat.   
                                                 
20 Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision Making, 25. 
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A. SOURCES OF RISK  
Understanding the source of risk is important in the overall understanding of the 
subject. The aspects of risk inherent to the environment encompass natural risk. These are 
risks present in training and combat. Natural risks are the only risks in a training 
environment, for training involves no adversary. Examples of natural risk are weather, 
terrain, environmental hazards like disease and sickness, and the risks inherent to 
soldiering like carrying heavy weight or maneuvering. In combat, the risks imposed by an 
adversary are added to the natural risk. Most often in combat one side is indigenous to the 
environment and the other is not, which reveals inherent advantages in adjusting to risk. 
Understanding how one side has an advantage depending on the source of the risk reveals 
important aspects of risk vital to training and mitigating risk in the military.  
Getting beyond the ability for the fighting force to adapt to the natural risk in 
combat starts with understanding risk in training. Although the essence of the sources of 
risk is present in Army doctrine, other parts of doctrine complicate this point. The 
military assertion that we must “train as we fight” clouds the notion that training can 
never fully replicate combat. Even with simulations, live-fire training, and force-on-force 
exercises, combat is never exactly the same as training. FM 7–0 Training for Full 
Spectrum Operations notes “‘Train as you fight’ means training under the conditions of 
the expected operational environment.”21  The conditions of the operational environment 
would include the enemy, yet it is impossible to train with a thinking enemy that is 
attempting to impose risk upon opposing forces in the same way he would in combat. 
Clarification in our doctrine or further development of our leaders to recognize that the 
“conditions of the expected operational environment” do not include the full realism of 
the enemy but only anticipated enemy tactics coupled with replicated environmental 
conditions is the best way to understand how to train. 
More important to understand than a doctrinal slogan is that when a unit deploys 
to combat not trained it incurs more risk in combat than if it is trained. This statement 
seems obvious, yet it is a common mistake in our military that when units face a task that 
                                                 
21 U.S. Army, Field Manual 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations (Washington, DC: Army 
Publishing Directorate, 12 December 2008), paras. 2-23, 2-5. 
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they have not trained on they are expected to rely on the flexible nature of the soldier 
coupled with his unwavering will and courage to overcome his lack of training.   This 
may be possible, but to be unaware of the increased risk to both our mission and our 
forces when they address a problem that they have not faced before or have little 
knowledge of is negligent. Even more troubling is when leaders widely understand the 
risky nature of combat, yet expect leaders at the tactical level to anticipate and mitigate 
risks they have never faced before. 
The counterinsurgency training of the U.S. Armed Forces before the war in 
Vietnam is an example of how a lack of training leads to an increase in combat risk. The 
Army at all levels failed to adequately educate its members on guerrilla warfare and 
counterinsurgency. In his work The Army and Vietnam, Andrew Krepenevich writes 
about the disconnected nature of the post-WWII Army leadership with the specific 
strategic guidance from President Kennedy to focus on counterinsurgency and guerrilla 
warfare. Army generals appeased the President, but due to their conventional nature they 
only created a façade of training. Not only was the training inadequate, but the trainers 
were not experts on the subject of counterinsurgency. Only after 1965 did the Army 
increase its counterinsurgency training based on the clear commitment of the U.S. to 
address the regional problems in Indochina.22  Still “it is easy to understand how the 
Army entered the war so unprepared in 1965.”23  This unpreparedness incurred an 
increased risk throughout the war. 
Conversely, a good example of how incurring training risk can provide valuable 
insight to decrease combat risk occurred at Slapton Sands in April of 1944. In an effort to 
simulate combat risk, Allied forces conducted a live-fire amphibious landing rehearsal off 
the coast of England at Slapton Sands in preparation for D-Day. This operation, named 
Exercise Tiger, revealed some valuable lessons that the Allied forces used to adjust their 
planning for D-Day. 
                                                 
22 Andrew F. Krepenevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), 49–53. 
23 Krepenevich, Vietnam, 55. 
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First, Exercise Tiger revealed the poor coordination ability between the Army and 
Navy.24  This poor coordination occurred when the HMS Hawkins received word to shift 
H-hour and delay the naval bombardment due to a delay from the landing force. Not all 
of the landing force received this order and some boats were landing as the naval 
bombardment impacted the beach, forcing observers to stop the firing.25  MG Leonard T. 
Gerow, the V Corps commander observing the exercise concluded that once H-hour is set 
it must never change because of the confusion that will arise.26  More important than 
mere confusion was that a change in H-hour could cause the landing force to loiter within 
range of the enemy beachhead, causing a severe loss of life. 
Second, GEN Dwight Eisenhower learned another valuable lesson from the 
exercise that directly contributed to the planning for D-day. Eisenhower noted the 
accuracy of the bombs on target, prompting him to consider bringing the landing force 
500 yards closer than the original 1500-yard restriction. As he stated this to LTG Omar 
Bradley, a plane dropped its bombs 500 yards short, confirming the commander’s 
original assessment. 
These lessons came at a high cost due to the coordination issues and an attack 
from Nazi E-boats sank two LST ships, ultimately resulting in the death of 441 soldiers 
and 197 sailors.27  Despite these losses the cost could have been greater. Eisenhower 
feared that some officers with the knowledge of the actual D-day plan code named 
Operation Neptune could be captured by German forces after the sinking of the LSTs. In 
addition, the maneuver of 30,000 troops around the English Channel could have 
completely compromised the D-day planning. Exercise Tiger pushed the limits of training 
risk.   
                                                 
24 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 515. 
25 CAPT (USNR) Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1946), 528. 
26 Butcher, My Three Years, 529. 
27 Samuel Eliot Morrison, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. XI, The 
Invasion of France and Germany (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001; New York: Brown and Company, 
1957), 66. 
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CAPT Harry Butcher came away from Exercise Tiger “feeling depressed” but 
aptly notes in his memoirs that “frequently the poorest kind of exercise presages the best 
actual operation because the failures are noticed and corrected.”28 Ultimately Butcher 
was right due to a glaring and ironic fact that more lives were lost during Exercise Tiger 
than during the landing on Utah Beach, the D-day objective that Tiger was designed to 
prepare for. It is foolish to declare that the loss of life in Exercise Tiger directly spared 
lives in combat, but the lessons gleaned from the mistakes in training did decrease the 
combat risk of the D-day landings.  
B. THE RISK OF AVOIDING RISK 
Preparing for the right task in the wrong way is how poor training can increase 
combat risk. Risk avoidance is often the method leading to this failure resulting in the 
self-perception that a unit is trained, but is not. Strict control of training environments is a 
method of risk avoidance that prevents units from facing risks. Yaacov Vertzberger 
writes in his book Risk Taking and Decision Making, “The broader view of risk should 
take into account the chance that risk avoidance in the short run may turn out to be a very 
risky decision.”29  Risk avoidance is more risk taking than risk avoiding. Vertzberger 
includes examples of strategic decisions on whether or not to deploy troops. He writes 
that deciding to avoid risking troops lives could allow a small security problem to get 
bigger and in the long run risk more troops when they are eventually mobilized.30   
Another example of the risk incurred from risk avoidance occurs in the military 
training approach to fire missions. This risk-avoidant approach to fire missions resides in 
avoiding training “danger close” missions that can occur in combat. JFIRE: Multi-service 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE) is a 
compilation of field manuals from all military services that addresses danger close in two 
ways. First, danger close is included in the “method of engagement” line of a call for fire 
request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target. Second, aircraft delivery of 
                                                 
28 Butcher, My Three Years, 529. 
29 Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision Making, 25. 
30 Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision Making, 25. 
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ordnance inside 0.1%, or 1 out of 1000, Probability of Incapacitation (PI) distances are 
considered danger close.31  Danger close is a term that is exclusive from Risk-Estimate 
Distance (RED), although the RED for 0.1% PI is used to define danger close for aircraft 
delivery. Danger close is also exclusive from the Minimum Safe Distance (MSD) that is 
utilized for “peacetime training.”32 
Important to note here is how the bureaucratic nature of the military can easily 
contradict itself through doctrine. The JFIRE manual states that danger close fire 
missions are permitted in combat but forbidden in training.33  Yet, the Army Field 
Manual 3–21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company, plainly states that “[i]f required, the 
company commander can even call for artillery fires right on his company position using 
proximity or time fuses for airbursts.”34  On one hand the doctrine restricts the training of 
danger close missions and on the other hand it outlines danger close missions as a tool for 
a commander in combat. These two manuals are fundamental to maneuver warfare while 
also conflicting in their guidance. This conflicting guidance from doctrine infers the 
dangerous nature of combat while overly promoting safety in training. Overly safe 
approaches lead to risk avoidance that causes inadequate training of fires “danger close.”  
Telling a commander that he can call fires on his position in combat but not accepting the 
risks to properly train him or her to do so is an irresponsible approach to prepare for 
combat. Excessive restrictions on training a call for fire, caused by risk avoidance, is an 
insufficient approach to properly preparing commanders for this decision. 
The risk avoidant nature of military manuals delineate between training and 
combat when training is intended to prepare units for combat. Forward Observers and 
Joint Air Tactical Controllers are required to manage fires from aircraft in the complexity 
of close battle but due to the training restrictions on fires, the difference in distance 
                                                 
31 U.S. Department of Defense, JFIRE: Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the 
Joint Application of Firepower (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 105. 
32 JFIRE, 124–125. 
33 JFIRE, 105. 
34 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company (Washington, DC: Army Publishing 
Directorate, July 2006), paras. 10–83, 10–21.  
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between training and fighting can be 1,115 meters.35  The disparity between the danger 
close distance and the minimum safe distance has room for adjustment. The JFIRE 
manual bases RED distances on three assumptions: “friendly troops are standing 
unprotected in the open, in winter clothing and helmet, and on a line perpendicular to the 
line of fire.”36  These assumptions do not reflect the reality of combat. Changing the 
assumptions that are utilized in assessing the risks of danger close fires greatly mitigates 
the risk while training fire supporters to call for fire at distances similar to combat.   
The danger of training at the highly restrictive minimum safe distances prevents 
leaders from managing the risks of close combat. Leaders may approach fire support in 
combat in the same manner in which the manual does:  a simplistic combination of 
weapon system, ammunition, and distance, that results in a black and white determination 
of whether a fire mission poses risk to friendly forces or not. Simple approaches to 
combat situations can be useful, but simple approaches often lead us to create simple 
training, focused on risk avoidance, which does not teach leaders how to mitigate risks in 
combat. This tendency is another example how the common cliché used in military 
circles that we “train as we fight” is not exactly true. As our Commanders and Forward 
Observers stand on an open hilltop on a range and squint through binoculars at a safe 
distance to attempt to see the impact and effect of rounds on the target we must ask 
ourselves whether this is properly preparing them to make decisions concerning risk in 
combat. 
C. TRAINING PROCESSES FOCUSED ON PERFORMANCE OF TASKS 
Preparing to address risk in combat is a training process that requires a unit or 
individual to effectively perform their tasks. Since training cannot perfectly replicate the 
conditions of combat, which would include one side taking steps to impose risk upon the 
other, military units must focus on performing their duties proficiently despite the 
adverse conditions of the natural environment. Creating training under adverse conditions 
                                                 
35 This determination from the author utilizes the difference between the minimum safe distance 
(MSD) of 1200m, for peacetime training, and danger close distance of 185m of a GBU-38 500 1b JDAM 
according to the JFIRES manual. 
36 JFIRE, 106. 
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applies a combination of experience and training practices to help units collectively 
prepare. Army training philosophy realizes the benefit of “training for proficiency” and 
performing the “fundamentals first” in “challenging, complex, ambiguous, and 
uncomfortable situations.”37 Creating an environment described by doctrine requires 
acknowledgment of the risk inherent to the military profession. Military units cannot train 
as their doctrine guides them while at the same time pretending that the environment they 
create has no risk. Trainers who control the environment to a degree that reduces the risk 
to a negligible level actually create an unrealistic situation that ceases to be the 
environment that will prepare units for combat. Performing tasks well in training under 
negligible levels of risk provides some benefit, but leaders must acknowledge that it is 
not the optimal way to train. 
D. OPTIMAL TRAINING RISK TO MITIGATE COMBAT RISK 
Understanding the inherent risk of combat and training helps trainers tie the two 
environments together in order to conceptualize an optimal way to train. Leaders can 
justify the risk in training because risk faced in training mitigates risk in combat, 
overtime. Viewing training and combat along a continuous spectrum of time will help 
reduce risk avoidance in training. Leaders will realize that unchallenging training is risky 
because it does not prepare subordinates for the risk that occurs from performing military 
duties in different environments. When the risk from adversaries is added upon the 
natural risk of the environment, units will not be able to perform their duties for they will 
not know how to mitigate the spectrum of risks imposed on them. Even worse is the 
tendency that we reward those leaders who do not make mistakes, which fosters risk 
aversion. The result is a leader who is placed in charge in combat who has performed 
well in a non-risky training regimen, but has never learned from mistakes so he does not 
recognize how to mitigate risks. If this leader learned of the inherently risky nature of 
training and combat by making mistakes in training then he can appreciate how much 
better prepared he is to face risk during combat operations. 
                                                 
37 U.S. Army, Field Manual 7-0, paras 2-23, 2-5. 
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On the other hand, creating training plans that are risky without weighing the 
worth of facing risk to prepare for combat is also an incorrect approach to military 
training. Leaders should not just take risks for the sake of taking risks. Individuals can 
vary greatly in how they view risk. Some are risk-takers while others have the tendency 
to shy away from small risks. The tendency to lean one way or the other is the product of 
the past that creates a consistent cycle of risk acceptance or risk avoidance. The danger 
here is to rely solely on individual judgment and not a deliberate decision making 
process. This process should reveal that at some point the added risk in training is not 
worth reducing the risk in combat. The basis for this point of diminishing return resides 
in balancing the level training with the probability of conducting the mission in combat. 
This idea is better understood by combining training and combat risk to reveal a “net 
risk” of the two environments. Since economics can help explain human behavior when 
seeking the best decision, it will help illustrate the relationships of risk in different 
environments.38 
E. THE ECONOMY OF RISK  
The relationship between training risk and combat risk is similar to the economic 
principles of supply and demand. Training risk is the amount of risk a unit is willing to 
“supply” in response to the “demand” of combat risk.   
                                                 




Figure 11.   Supply and Demand 
Figure 11 depicts a standard supply and demand model that when applied to risk 
forms the model in Figure 12. A review of the terms of the two figures will help illustrate 
the connection of the two models and the similarities of their governing dynamics. First, 
price dictates what something will cost, just as risk is the variance of potential costs in 
training or combat. The quantity sold at a particular price is similar to training realism at 
a particular amount of risk because when in a combat environment a unit is essentially 
“supplying” their skills built in training in the form of their performance as “demanded” 
by combat. Furthermore, the economic market equilibrium “is a price and quantity that 
consumers are willing to pay to purchase the amount producers are willing to supply at a 
particular price.”39  This equilibrium is the optimal point where the amount of training 
risk and quantity of training realism are at levels that are commensurate with the 
probability of facing combat. At this point a unit or individual is best prepared for combat 
at the lowest risk because the net risk is minimized. 
                                                 
39 Kingma, Economics of Information, 46. 
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Figure 12.   Relationship Between Training Risk and Combat Risk 
F. VARIABLES OF THE TRAINING AND COMBAT RISK CURVES 
Minimizing risk is what units seek when viewing the combination of training and 
combat risk. The optimal training level in Figure 12 is the point that minimizes the net 
risk. The optimal point in this economic model becomes more interesting and 
sophisticated when discussing what variables change the slope and positions of the 
training risk and the combat risk curves and can hence change the optimal point. Some 
variables that change supply and demand curves are the prices of other goods, 
technology, and expectations.40  With this risk model, the slope and position of the 
curves, and the optimal point change primarily based on three variables. First, as the 
probability of deploying to combat increases, the need for a higher training level 
increases. These two increases cause a unit to move up the training risk curve toward the 
optimal point. Second, the type of unit and its mission increases or decreases the slope of 
the training risk curve. For example, an infantry soldier conducts riskier training than a 
hospital technician, which illustrates why the slope of the curve changes. Third, the slope 
of the combat risk increases or decreases based on the type and location of the unit. 
                                                 
40 Roy J. Ruffin and Paul R. Gregory, Principles of Economics, Third Edition (Glenview, IL: Scott, 
Foresman and Company, 1988), 70, 75. 
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Different conflicts and different geographical locations within a conflict impose different 
risks. A medic in an infantry unit in a small outpost in the mountains will have different 
risk curves compared to a medic in a Combat Support Hospital in the center of a large 
well-defended base. Examples of different units and different duties within those units 
will illustrate how variables can change the slope and position of the curves.  
In Figure 13, the training risk and combat risk combine to form net risk of the two 
curves. This model depicts a few nuanced dynamics, namely how training risk reduces 
combat risk at different rates, training realism increases training risk, and combat risk 
never goes to zero. No matter what the level of training there still exists an inherent level 
of risk in combat. In addition, the model reveals the lowest net risk is an optimal point, 
which notably does not have to occur at the intersection of the training and combat risk 
curves. The parabolic shape of the net risk curve means that the minimum risk occurs 
when the slope of the curve is zero, its lowest point. Furthermore, the graph in Figure 13 
depicts an Infantry Battalion that is not scheduled to deploy. This is important because 
the combat risk level assumed by the unit increases as the probability of deploying to 
combat increases. Figures on subsequent pages will illustrate this conclusion.  
 
Figure 13.   Risk Levels for an Infantry Battalion Not Scheduled to Deploy 
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The first dynamic that training risk reduces combat risk is obvious. What is not 
obvious is the rate at which training can reduce combat risk, which is depicted in this 
model for the Infantry Battalion. In Figure 13 the relatively flat training risk curve that 
occurs at a low level of training realism and the corresponding steep downward slope of 
the combat risk curve depict how a small amount of training can quickly reduce combat 
risk. For example, there is a significant contrast between soldiers with no marksmanship 
training who are sent into combat versus soldiers who are trained on a range for just six 
hours. The first soldier may not know how to load, aim, or fire the weapon while in a 
short period of training the latter could conceivably hit targets within a hundred meters. 
While time training on a range reduces the combat risk, training risk increases as 
training realism in the context of combat increases. The training risk increases with more 
complex tasks in order to increase the level of proficiency of soldiers that combat 
requires. An example for the Infantry Battalion is a company live-fire that simultaneously 
integrates external indirect fire support from artillery and fire support from aerial assets 
such as helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. These complex training events seek to 
increase the ability of a Commander to manage his own assets on the battlefield, without 
the presence of an enemy firing back. Even without the enemy imposing risk, the training 
risk is very high (more on the right side of the training realism scale). But this training 
event greatly reduces the combat risk by increasing the unit proficiency at tasks they must 
perform in combat.   
Although reducing combat risk through realistic training is the goal of units 
preparing for war, there exists a level of combat risk that will always remain. Combat is 
inherently risky and even the most proficient soldiers often face risks that can be 
insurmountable. A commander who has proficiently managed his own maneuver 
elements, has conducted realistic training that integrates external assets in conjunction 
with his maneuver, and has a deep understanding of the enemy force and its capabilities 
still has the potential of losing troops or failing to accomplish the mission. The factors of 
natural risk, like the weather or terrain, or risk imposed by the enemy, like planting an 
IED or infiltrating the commander’s defenses, are risks that still exist at a certain level 
that no amount of training can reduce to zero.   
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Despite the minimum level of combat risk that remains exclusive from training, 
an optimal point in the relationship between both risk environments is important to 
explore. This key point is where the slope of the net risk curve is zero and is the optimal 
training level and risk level in the context of a unit that is designated for combat. Below 
the optimal point the training level has not reached a point that has significantly reduced 
the combat risk. Economically speaking this is a shortage, where the quantity demanded 
exceeds the quantity supplied.41  A shortage will produce a unit that has poorly prepared 
for the tasks it will perform in combat or a unit that is well trained on tasks it will not 
perform in combat and is therefore unprepared for war. Beyond the optimal point the 
risks associated with training realism are not worth the cost because it reduces combat 
risk at a lower rate and the net risk begins to increase. This is a surplus, where the 
quantity supplied exceeds the quantity demanded.42  Risks are simply being taken when 
they do not need to be.     
Understandably, assuming risk to prepare for combat without having the potential 
of deploying to combat should change the risk a unit is willing to take in training. This 
change creates a rational reduction in training level, in a sense avoiding a surplus. 
Avoiding a surplus rationally explains why a nation not at war has the tendency to 
become risk averse. Unfortunately leaders fail to recognize that the lower probability of 
combat rationally necessitates a reduction in training risk. Instead leaders conduct risky 
training under tight levels of control that creates the perception of being prepared that 
may rationally be a waste of resources in light of the low potential of future conflict.   
 
                                                 
41 Ruffin, Principles of Economics, 78. 
42 Ruffin, Principles of Economics, 79. 
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Figure 14.   Risk Levels for Infantry Battalion Scheduled to Deploy 
Despite this rational tendency, the star in Figure 14 depicts the ideal training level 
of a unit that is not designated for combat. As the potential for a combat deployment 
increases the level of training for the unit should move toward the optimal point as 
depicted by the arrow in Figure 14. Moving toward the optimal point increases training 
risk and realism as combat risk is reduced. In a sense, the probability of combat requires 
the supply of training to go up to avoid a shortage. Conversely, as the probability of 
combat goes down risks in training go down to avoid a surplus. While the optimal level is 
a point that is ideal when combat is certain, trainers reduce training risk as probability of 
combat goes down. 
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Figure 15.   Risk Levels for Peacetime Combat Support Hospital 
In contrast to the infantry battalion, the curves of the Combat Support Hospital 
model in Figure 15 are different based on the tasks performed in combat and the specialty 
of different soldiers. The curves are flatter and lower on risk level compared to an 
infantry unit. The flat curves depict the complexity of the task of medical personnel. 
Medical tasks require more time to train, unlike spending a few hours on a range, yet are 
relatively low risk in the context of combat because they are normally placed in safer 
areas protected by combat troops. The relationship between training risk and combat risk 
are tighter, meaning that the tasks they perform during peacetime and in combat are in 
very similar environments in this case a hospital. The inherent level of combat risk in a 
Combat Support Hospital is significantly lower than those faced by the infantry, but a 
minimal level still exists in the environment. Risks from indirect fire or the enemy 
attacking a large base is low but still possible. 
Even though the Combat Support Hospital deals with lower risks to soldiers, its 
optimal point should still be viewed in the context of the potential of going to combat.   
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Figure 16.   Risk Levels for Wartime Combat Support Hospital 
The star in Figure 16 shifts along the arrow as the probability that the hospital unit 
goes to combat increases. Here the training level is relatively close to the optimal level 
and only requires a small shift to optimize. The costs to the hospital unit are different 
based on the job specialty. These costs oftentimes involve acquiring more expensive 
equipment and specialty personnel that are seldom utilized outside of combat as the 
probability for combat increases. Due to high cost, the risk of using expensive equipment 
in the hospital is not worth training on unless the potential for combat has reached a 
certain level. 
This optimal level is important because it provides a way to understand the many 
errors that military trainers make in managing training in the context of combat. Military 
trainers desire to maximize the training level of their units often without analyzing if the 
tasks they are training are reducing combat risks. Even more intricate is to understand 
that some tasks reduce risks in combat at a greater rate and should be prioritized over 
tasks that reduce risks at a slower rate. Furthermore, the level of training for combat 
should be in the context of the Military Operational Specialty (MOS) of the individuals. 
The idea that “Every Marine is a Rifleman” or that all soldiers should be trained like an 
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infantryman is inefficient in the context of preparing for combat. Although these slogans 
exhort branches of the military to rally around a mantra of a fighting force and to 
emphasize the minimum standard for all Marines or soldiers in combat, trainers must 
balance the standard for fighting and training specialty duties on the tactical level. If 
training a particular MOS involves skills outside basic soldier tasks or skills beyond the 
individual soldier specialty then trainers are training incorrectly. For example, the medic 
training to employ a claymore mine instead of training how to stabilize a casualty or the 
mechanic that is learning about explosive breaching instead of learning the proper way to 
troubleshoot a tank often is the result of trainers mismanaging how they prepare soldiers 
for combat. 
 
Figure 17.   Combat Risk Curve Shift 
 Another way to depict the increased combat risk due to the increased probability 
of going to combat is an actual shift of the combat risk curve. Figure 17 shows three 
different positions of the combat risk curve that represent the combat risk to three 
different types of units from least to greatest risk. For illustrative purposes, Unit A can be 
the National Guard, Unit B can be the 82nd Airborne Division, and Unit C can be a 
Special Missions Unit. Unit A has no planned combat deployment in their future. Unit A 
therefore does not need to prepare themselves for combat to the same level of readiness 
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as Unit B. Unit B represents a unit who could possibly deploy and must be ready, yet the 
frequency that they are deployed is not very high. Finally, Unit C knows they will deploy 
and the readiness of their unit is based on routine and frequent deployments to combat 
that demands and increase in their training level and their risk level. 
 
Figure 18.   Net Risk Curve Shift 
 Figure 18 represents the net risk level of each of the units in Figure 17. As the 
combat risk curve shifts with the increased probability of combat the net risk also 
increases. Not only does the combat risk curve change based on the duty of the 
individual, as with the Infantryman and medic within the Combat Support Hospital in 
previous examples, but it can also change based on the type of unit and their associated 
potential for combat. In other words combat risk changes based on duty position and unit. 
G. CONCLUSION 
A deeper knowledge of the dynamics and sources of risk will help prevent the 
potential for mismanagement of training and optimize resources and time in preparation 
for combat. The conclusion here is that the source of the risk in training and in combat is 
not the same. Training includes natural risk while combat compounds natural risk with 
risk from an adversary. Since risk from an adversary can only be truly appreciated in 
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combat, training focuses on doing tasks well in difficult environments. Conducting tasks 
and processes well leads to another discovery that training mitigates combat risk 
therefore it is best to view risk in these two different environments together. The 
economic model of supply and demand provides a clear methodology to understand the 
complexity of the relationship between the two risk environments. The model shows how 
training to mitigate combat risks involves a certain amount of training risk that increases 
as training realism increases. Just as supply and demand curves change with different 
factors, training risk and combat risk curves change position based on the probability of 
combat and change slope based on the tasks a unit or individual is trained to perform. 
Viewing the two risks environments together should ultimately help trainers resist the 
tendency to avoid risk in training, which is more risky because it fails to reduce combat 
risk. These conclusions will help leaders and trainers manage expectations and resources 
in preparation for combat in a more sophisticated way. The aim here is not to provide a 
solution but a more analytical process for creating a solution. Ultimately this will help 
trainers avoid preparing for the wrong task or avoid preparing for the right task in the 
wrong way. 
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IV. RISK IN COMBAT 
For centuries, warrior scholars have attempted to understand the dynamics of 
conflict where two or more adversaries impose risk on one another while also addressing 
the risks natural to their environment. Utilizing decision theory with two competing 
decision makers will aid in revealing the complexity of decisions in combat. A rigorous 
exploration of how adversaries impose risk on one another through an abstract example 
followed by a series of applications expose three main points. First, outcomes of 
decisions are determined by multiple variables but all variables do not affect the outcome 
with equal weight. A sound decision process helps identify how each variable affects the 
outcome and which variables should be the focus to make the right decision. Second, the 
decision criteria should determine how decisions are made. Decision criteria is also 
referred to as decision strategy that focuses the decision maker to make decisions based 
on what he values in the outcome. Third, understanding risk is central to decision-making 
because risk is part of every decision and it depicts the difference between the best and 
worst outcome.  
Beyond these three main points many errors occur in decision making that greatly 
affect the ability of the military to make decisions effectively. Policies established by 
higher-level commands can prevent lower level leaders from even having the power to 
make decisions in certain combat situations, which greatly inhibits the ability to manage a 
battle. This point exposes the shortfalls of centralized control while advocating for de-
centralized control in light of inherent risks involved in both methods. Additionally, 
policies that inhibit choices establish a status quo that creates a cyclical pattern where 
little freedom exists to break the cycle. These cycles often include repeating mistakes in 
strategy and often come at a high cost before they are changed. Evidence of these errors 
is displayed throughout this chapter through abstract examples and then specific and 
common instances. The aim of this chapter is to provide an example of a decision process 
that will aid military leaders in bolstering their decision-making through the proper 
identification of the right variables. This process will also help identify the risk and the 
decision criteria to create deeply knowledgeable decision maker. 
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The first step in illustrating these three main points involves returning to the 
principles established in Chapter I. Recalling the game of Deal or No Deal will aid in 
illustrating some sophisticated principles of expected value using decision theory. The 
purpose of this example is to introduce the format of a decision tree (in other examples a  





Figure 19.   Decision Tree Example Where Expected Value is Greater Than Maximin 
Figure 19 is a decision tree of the contestant. The first decision node depicts the 
decision of the contestant to choose the offer of $400,000, the Deal, or to select No Deal. 
Choosing No Deal will subject the contestant to a probability. The 50 percent probability 
determines the expected value of $500,000 (E(X)= .5(0) + .5($1,000,000) =$500,000), 
which is greater than the $400,000 (E(X)  = 1($400,000) = $400,000) offer from the 
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banker. Even with the greater expected value of the No Deal option, selecting the 
guarantee of $400,000 would be a maximin strategy where a player selects the option that 
maximizes their minimum gain. A maximin strategy is often the more prudent choice in 
one-time decisions. Sometimes a minimax strategy is a better option where the player 
seeks to minimize their maximum loss or avoid their worst outcome. If the contestant 
could play this game one hundred times, or for the long haul, then expected value would 






Figure 20.   Protected or Unprotected Game Tree 
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A. THE “PROTECTED” OR “UNPROTECTED” DECISION 
The game tree in Figure 20 depicts the combination of decisions and probabilities 
that result in outcomes with an associated payoff for each player in an armed conflict. In 
this example the opposing players, Blue and Red, make decisions to maximize their 
payoffs. A square node is a decision made by either Blue or Red and the circle node is a 
probability that occurs as a result of that decision. The decision or the result of the 
probability is written along the line that connects the nodes. The payoff and associated 
conditional probability is next to the triangle that represents the terminal node. The 
payoffs in Figure 18 span a utility scale from -100 to 100 and all examples here depict 
Blue force payoffs where Red’s payoffs while not written in Figure 19 are the negative of 
Blue’s payoffs. Using the combination of probabilities and payoffs reveals the expected 
value of each decision. In order to fully understand the depth and scalability of this game 
tree as an example of a decision process it is essential to determine the assumptions used 
to formulate the tree, the variables that can change the outcome, and the decision criteria 
as determined by the nature of the players and the situation. 
The assumptions used to formulate this game tree are based on the common 
practice of each decision maker, the nature of low-intensity conflict, and the experience 
of the authors. The first assumption is that the Blue player represents a larger 
conventional force that is less familiar with the specific environment of the conflict but 
has more resources, superior firepower, and advanced technology. The Red force is a 
smaller guerrilla or insurgency force that is more familiar with the environment, is more 
flexible with less technology, and tends to have a tougher force that are warriors by 
nature.43  Slight adjustment of the probabilities and payoffs in Figure 18 is subject to 
debate but it would be difficult for anyone to argue for a drastic change in these values 
based on the nature of the opposing forces in irregular conflict. After all this set up of the 
players is the most common structure of conflict since the end of WWII.44 
                                                 
43 Major C. E. Calwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Watchmaker Publishing, 1899), 
125. 
44 Internal War Database, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, 2006. 
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The second assumption concerns the first Blue force decision. Selecting Protected 
assumes increased survivability and lethality for the Blue force while sacrificing stealth 
and surprise. If Blue chooses to be Unprotected he chooses less lethality and survivability 
but also reduces his chances of detection by choosing a posture to remain hidden as a 
member of the Blue force. The third assumption is that both Blue and Red seek to 
maximize their outcomes. This means that each player will attack upon detecting the 
other player because it will yield a higher payoff. Those payoffs are highly contingent on 
the fourth assumption that Red has the first opportunity to detect Blue. If Red does not 
detect Blue based on the probabilistic outcome then Blue has an opportunity to detect 
Red.   
These assumptions are important when determining the probabilities and payoffs 
for each variable in the game. The probabilities and payoffs associated with the variables 
are what change the outcome of the game and can be adjusted upon a change of the 
situation of conflict. Here, the variables are protection, detection, and success of attack. 
Breaking down Figure 18 into the Protected branch of the game and then the Unprotected 
branch of the game will aid in explaining the probabilities and payoffs associated with 







Figure 21.   “Protected” Game Tree 
B. “PROTECTED” GAME TREE  
The “Protected” side of the game tree in Figure 21 begins with the Blue force 
deciding for a more survivable and lethal posture toward the enemy. The first chance 
node is P1 where the probability that Red will detect Blue is .8, or 80%. This probability 
is relatively high because of Blue’s decision to be protected. The conventional nature of 
the Blue force has chosen to be highly survivable and lethal yet easily detected and 
engaged. There still is a .2, or 20% chance that Red will not detect Blue. If Red detects 
Blue, which will occur four out of five times, Red will decide to attack because he wants 
to maximize his payoffs. In examining the P3 chance node, Red’s chance of success in 
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the attack comes into play. Success is only 20% because of Blue’s lethality and 
survivability. The payoff for this series of decisions and probabilities is -50 for Blue 
because he was surprised by the battle from an enemy that he did not detect. Success for 
Red in this attack is Blue’s second worst outcome because although he was attacked Blue 
was still highly survivable in this situation. Backing up to P3, the outcome for an 
“Unsuccessful Attack” by Red occurs 80% of the time with a payoff of -25 for Blue 
because Red is a small force with less firepower against the superior numbers of Blue. 
The unsuccessful attack is based on both the size of the Red force and the survivability 
and lethality of Blue. For Red, even when unsuccessful in the attack the force still 
benefits while Blue renders the cost of -25. The payoff is limited to a -25 loss because 
Blue is on the receiving end of an attack and he can possibly fight out of it based on his 
protection and lethality. 
Blue’s lethality plays a major role in his payoffs when Red does not detect him. 
Beginning again at chance node P1 there is a 20% chance that Red will not detect Blue, 
either due to limited visibility or carelessness of the Red force. This event is rare but still 
possible. This chance event is followed by another chance node P2. At P2 there are 
associated probabilities that Blue will or will not detect Red. There is an 80% chance that 
Blue will not detect Red and the two sides will not meet in conflict. This occurs often in 
vast areas of operation with an elusive and part-time enemy. The payoff here is zero, or 
the status quo where both sides gain nothing and lose nothing. More interesting is the 
20% of the time that Blue detects Red. Blue will attack and have associated probabilities 
of success or failure at chance node P4. Based on the outlined assumptions, 90% of the 
time Blue will be successful in an attack. Blue has superior technology, lethality, and 
protection as well as external assets to exact damage on the enemy. This combination 
results in Blue’s highest payoff of 100. The 10% chance that Blue will be unsuccessful in 
an attack is due to the possibility of complex terrain, weapons malfunctions, poor 
communication, or poor training of the unit. Even with superior technology the Red force 
is known to have an uncanny ability to “hinder decisive action” because of his 
decentralized control, speed, and ability to survive in austere environments.45  Blue’s 
                                                 
45Calwell, Small Wars, 124. 
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payoff is 50, his second highest, for even if he is unsuccessful Blue has survived and 
achieved some degree of decisive engagement on an elusive enemy even if only in the 
opening moments of the engagement upon an unaware Red force. 
Using the Blue player’s payoffs and probabilities associated with each outcome 
will determine the expected value of his decision to choose protection. The expected 
value of protection is -20.2. Determining this value involves multiplying each combined 
probability with each payoff, then summing them together. Table 5 depicts this 
calculation.   
 
Table 5.   Expected Value Protected 
Calculating the expected value in Table 5 is useful for analyzing this decision. It 
is relatively easy to see the probability of each payoff that determines the frequency of 
each outcome, over time. Here Red attacks Blue unsuccessfully but still achieves a 
benefit by initiating the attack. This will occur 64% of the time, by far the most common 
event. The frequency of this outcome is conceivable in this example because in a 
protracted conflict where a conventional force meets guerilla or insurgent forces the 
engagements are small, frequent, and can slowly attrit the conventional side. The relative 
infrequency of Blue’s greatest outcome (3.6%) is also understandable based on the 
assumptions and the nature of insurgencies that prevent decisive engagements. Further 




Figure 22.   “Unprotected” Game Tree 
 
C. “UNPROTECTED” GAME TREE 
The “Unprotected” Game Tree in Figure 22 begins with the Blue force opting for 
an unprotected posture that allows the force a higher probability of being undetected by 
the opposition. The Blue force is placing a higher emphasis on stealth and surprise over 
protection and lethality. Right away the contrast to the Protected option is evident where 
the probability that Red will detect Blue at chance node P1 is only 20%. Upon detection, 
the Red force will decide to attack. When Red attacks Blue, the Blue force is less lethal 
and survivable, which will benefit the Red force with a high probability of success in the 
attack of 90%. This success will result in Red’s best payoff of 100, for they have detected 
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a vulnerable Blue force that has chosen to be less lethal and survivable. At chance node 
P3 there is a 10% probability that the Red force will have an unsuccessful attack, where 
the Blue force may quickly break contact or fight back with some success. This still 
results in the second highest payoff for Red because they have initiated an attack on a 
vulnerable Blue force that has less ability to fight back. 
In the Unprotected option fighting back is essentially what Blue is trying to avoid. 
In being unprotected, Blue is attempting to avoid detection and therefore creating a 
situation to detect the Red force first. At chance node P1, Blue has an 80% chance of 
avoiding detection from Red, by far Blue’s best option for setting the stage for a 
successful attack. Even with sacrificing protection and lethality Blue will have more 
frequent success in engaging Red by detecting the Red force first. Upon remaining 
hidden from Red, Blue now has an 80% chance of detecting Red at chance node P2. Once 
Red is detected, Blue will attack with success 80% of the time with his second highest 
payoff of 50. This success and payoff is due to the ability of Blue to initiate an attack 
while also being limited by less lethality than the Protected option. The other branch of 
chance node P4 is the probability of 20% that Blue will execute an unsuccessful attack on 
Red. An unsuccessful attack would involve Blue possibly engaging only a small portion 
of the Red force or engaging and missing the target. The payoff in this instance is still 
Blue’s third highest. The final possible outcome of the Unprotected decision is at chance 
node P2 where Blue remains undetected but fails to detect Red. This payoff is zero 
because Blue does not lose anything but does not gain anything either. 
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Table 6.   Expected Value Unprotected 
Gaining and losing is the composition of the Blue force decisions. Just as with the 
Protected game tree, Table 6 helps analyze the decision for being unprotected. Here the 
probability of terminal node 3 is the most common outcome since in occurs just over half 
the time. This is important for Blue because with this option he achieves his second 
highest payoff over half the time. The other glaring outcome of this option is that Blue’s 
worst payoff of -100 will occur about 18% of the time, which is almost 1 out of 5. 
Looking specifically at the overall expected value of the decision, choosing Unprotected 
gives a positive payoff of 9.3, over time. 
D. DECISION CRITERIA 
The payoff of 9.3 is far better than the Protected decision that results in -20.2. It 
seems that this decision is cut and dry where choosing protection and lethality is not as 
beneficial as choosing stealth to avoid detection at a lower lethality. However, the 
analysis must continue further to discuss decision criteria. The literature of decision-
making and risk centers on the valued outcome of the decision maker. Before the 
decision is made one must establish what he values in the outcome of this decision. The 
expected value is of course a sound way to establish what outcome is the most beneficial 
over time. But what would be most beneficial is deceiving, which is often the explanation 
for a conservative strategy. Exploring the minimax of this game tree reveals that the 
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conservative strategy is to choose the ‘Protected’ option, for this side of the game tree 
guarantees avoiding the worst payoff of -100 even though Blue will incur some loss 75% 
of the time, no loss or gain 16% of the time, and a gain only 4% of the time. 
Avoiding the worst option is a common strategy in conflict where political 
considerations rooted in perception often dictate the conduct of war. Michelle Malvesti, 
former Senior Director of Combatting Terrorism Strategy and member of the National 
Security Staff uses a Jimmy Connors quote to explain the minimax strategy often 
employed by national security advisors. Jimmy Connors said, “I hate to lose more than I 
love to win.”  Dr. Malvesti suggests that strategies employed often focus on avoiding the 
worst outcome even at the expense of a higher expected value.46  This is salient in the 
analysis of risk in combat because just as outlined in Chapter I in the game of Chicken, 
Blue may opt for a conservative strategy where he will achieve only a 2 or a 3, so he will 
avoid a 1 but will never achieve his best option of a 4. This idea of a conservative 
strategy is also important when exploring the notions of prospect theory where Blue will 
try to avoid his worst outcome at all costs because the value of the payoff is well beyond 
the limit of the utility scale.  
E. RISK OF THE “PROTECTED/UNPROTECTED” DECISION  
Avoiding the worst outcome and the cost of doing so involves drawing on the 
thorough understanding of risk outlined in previous chapters. The 
“Protected/Unprotected” decision is a sophisticated example that reveals the utility of 
understanding risk in decision-making. First, the example provides a comparison of risk 
where the “less risky” option does not equate to a better decision. Second, it reveals the 
actual cost of preventing the worst outcome. Third, it determines what the true cost of the 
worst outcome would be on an extended utility scale in order to make the expected value 
of each decision equal. This in turn reveals how important the worst outcome is to the 
decision maker. Fourth, the game tree can be analyzed on different levels of detail to 
include the probability of loss and the probability of benefit. Analyzing on different 
                                                 
46 Dr. Michelle Malvesti, lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2012. 
http://jackson.yale.edu/malvesti.  
 55
levels helps reveal the fourth utility of the analysis that the decision process illuminates 
the important variables, meaning the variables that most affect the outcome of the 
decision. This will focus the decision maker to affect the right variable instead of 




Figure 23.   “Protected” and “Unprotected” Risk 
 56
Figure 23 contains both expected value tables for the Protected and Unprotected 
decision. Each table contains the possible outcomes of each decision with the associated 
probability and payoff for each outcome. Below the tables is a linear depiction of the 
dispersion of the expected values that displays the variance of the outcomes, or risk, for 
each decision. The linear graphic of each decision displays an easy way to compare one 
to the other. First, the Protected decision is less risky than the Unprotected decision. Less 
risky means there is less variance in the outcomes. For Protected, the dispersion from -16 
to 3.6 is 19.6 where the Unprotected option has dispersion from -18 to 25.6 for a total of 
43.6, making Unprotected more than twice the risk of Protected. Second, the Protected 
table shows that the worst outcome with a -100 payoff is not possible therefore choosing 
Protected avoids the worst outcome. There is a cost associated with making this choice. 
The tradeoff of cost and benefit is easily seen in the linear graphic where avoiding the 
cost of 2 (-16 to -18 the worst expected value of each decision) at the missed benefit of 
22 (25.6 to 3.6 the best expected value of each decision). The cost-benefit ratio is 1:11, 
where one mark of cost is worth eleven marks of benefit for the Protected choice. 
Another way to look at the differences of the two choices is that for both expected values 
to equal -20.2, the worst outcome would have to be worth -272 instead of -100. If the 
Protected option was chosen to avoid the worst outcome then -272 is what that value is 
actually worth to that decision maker.   
Focusing on the tables will scale the analysis into simpler components. 
Combining probabilities will determine the probability of cost and benefit for each 
option. When combining the probabilities of terminal nodes three and four of the 
Protected decision, the outcomes with a positive payoff occur .04 or 4% (.036 + .004) of 
the time. This decision has a 4% chance of resulting in a benefit. Doing the same for the 
Protected decision results in 64% (.512+.128=.64) probability of benefit. Conducting the 
same analysis for probability of cost the Protected and Unprotected choice has 80% and 
20% probabilities, respectively. If the decision criteria or strategy is to maximize benefit 
this analysis shows that choosing “Unprotected” is the right choice. Equally as beneficial 
is analyzing the value of avoiding the worst outcome. The choice for the minimax 
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strategy is “Protected,” and the analysis shows how much that avoidance is really worth, 
which will aid in determining if that is the right strategy. 
The analysis of cost and benefit also reveal that not all the variables affect the 
expected value of the decision with the same weight. Looking again at the game tree in 
Figure 20 detection is the variable that determines cost or benefit. Once the probability 
node P1 determines the route in the game tree, the ability for one side to detect the other 
determines the payoff, while the other variables (probability of success or degree of 
protection) determine to what degree and frequency that payoff is attained. This 
statement provides an interesting comparison of the focus of each decision. The Protected 
decision has more focus on controlling the variables that determine the degree of payoff 
while almost conceding the detection variable to the enemy. Conceding detection is clear 
through the frequency of cost and infrequency of benefit. The Unprotected decision is the 
opposite where the focus is on avoiding detection while detecting the opposing force thus 
increasing the probability of benefit, reducing the probability of cost, and also enabling 
the possibility, although infrequent, of the worst payoff. 
F. PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Presenting realistic examples of the abstract principles in The Game Tree in 
Figure 20 will further illustrate the reasoning for the probabilities and payoffs, the 
decision making process of identifying variables and how they affect outcomes, and why 
leaders make certain decisions and possibly why those decisions may not be the best.   
1. Up-Armored HMMWV vs. Pick-up Truck 
The first example of the “Protected” or “Unprotected” choice is moving through a 
combat zone protected in an Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) or relatively unprotected in a 
civilian pick-up truck. The UAH is protected and easily identifiable by the enemy. If the 
enemy chooses to attack upon detecting a UAH then the vehicle proves its worth because 
it is highly survivable and provides a legitimate fighting platform with a machine gun. 
The pick-up truck is a common civilian vehicle to the combat zone and is widely used by 
civilians. The enemy would have difficulty detecting opposing forces in this vehicle. If 
detection occurred then surviving an attack from this vehicle would be difficult because it 
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is not armored and shooting effectively from this platform would require getting out of 
the vehicle with small caliber weapons. 
Two common decision errors stem from this example. The first issue is ingrained 
in the current culture of the military where policy prevents the flexibility to even make a 
choice. The leadership of the military under the pressure of the current political culture 
seeks to avoid loss and bolster positive perceptions. The perception of moving in less 
protection and lethality in a combat zone even with the slim possibility of detection is for 
the most part intolerable. The pressure of perception forces leaders to opt for the minimax 
strategy that seeks to avoid the worst outcome even at more cost in the long run. The 
second error is that the lack of choice characteristic of centrally controlled militaries is 
rarely questioned, which maintains a rock-solid status quo, the foundation of which is 
virtually immovable.  
2. Body Armor vs. No Body Armor 
The same status quo is evident in the debate over body armor. This example has 
slightly different variables but the same decision process that poses a choice between 
protection of body armor or foregoing that protection for increased mobility by not 
wearing it. This is similar to the abstract example in this chapter because there is a focus 
on affecting the variables that have less effect on the outcome. Body armor is designed to 
protect the vital organs but is so heavy that it significantly reduces the mobility of the 
soldier making him easily targeted. Bluntly stated a soldier protects his chest but is so 
slow he exposes his head. Additionally, the weight of the armor makes a shooter less 
effective due to becoming easily tired. The decision for body armor clearly is focused on 
avoiding being killed or making injuries less lethal at the cost of increased lethality and 
maneuver against enemy forces.  
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Figure 24.   Cuirass Body Armor Hit by Cannon Ball, Battle of Waterloo, 1815 
Figure 24 is a striking example of the body armor decision and risk in general. 
The intent of the cuirass, an older form of body armor, in the French military was for 
protection. This protection gave up mobility and the cannonball-sized hole through the 
front and out the back obviously displays the limits of the desired protection. In terms of 
risk the brass chest piece illustrates that while a low probability, the worst outcome is 
always looming.  
3. Occupying Nuristan vs. Avoiding Nuristan 
A slightly different example with different variables deals with operational level 
warfare decisions. This centrally revolves around the structure, meaning the terrain and 
                                                 
47 Musee de l’Armee, National Military Museum, Paris, France, accessed November 14, 2012, 
http://www.ageod-forum.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=2987&stc=1&d=1213451770.    
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population density, of the operational environment and the strategy, meaning the plan to 
accomplish the mission, employed to win in that environment. The obvious shortfall 
resides in operational decisions that choose areas with difficult structures, namely 
mountains and jungles, then pair the difficult structure of the environment with poor 
strategy, namely a focus on amounting enemy casualties instead of positively 
manipulating the will of the people. Obviously a difficult structure and a poor strategy 
results in the worst outcome, where a manageable structure and sound strategy result in 
the best outcome. An example of this poor decision is the province of Nuristan, 
Afghanistan. This area is mostly rugged mountainous terrain containing a diverse 
population. Historically there has been little connection of this area to anyone outside of 
it, much less a centrally controlled government. There is little strategic interest in this 
region. Occupying the area is a decision with high costs and low benefits. A plausible 
reason that occupying this area would occur is due to a focus on the wrong variable.   
Here structure will often determine if the perfect strategy would even work. Thus, the 
structure is the illuminating variable that affects whether the outcome will yield a cost or 
a benefit. The strategy is an additional variable that determines the degree of the cost or 
benefit. 
4. Protect the Force vs. Accomplishing the Mission 
The final example is intended to pose a problem that deserves additional analysis 
and argue that the decision process outlined in this chapter is a good place to start. There 
exists a perpetual balance surrounding command decisions with protecting the force and 
accomplishing the mission. In conventional conflict these two ideas complement one 
another where one side protects the force through accomplishment of the mission. More 
plainly stated to protect your force you kill the other force. In the complexity of irregular 
warfare these two ideas work in opposite directions. The difficulty is that protecting your 
own force by killing the other force does not accomplish the mission and in most cases it 
degrades mission accomplishment. The center of this problem resides in a sound 
calculation of risk and determining the variables and the values of the cost and benefit. 
Edward Luttwak in his “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare” provides insight that a 
relational-maneuver force, a term he uses for an adaptable force that configures based on 
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the operational environment, “offers high payoffs of low material cost in exchange for 
corresponding risks.”48  A deeper understanding of risk will help decision-makers realize 
that any hopes of accomplishing the mission in irregular conflict will require an increased 
acceptance of risk in terms of protecting the force and in doing so will aid in 
accomplishing the mission.   
G. CONCLUSION 
Understanding and managing risk in combat requires a decision process. This 
process should help reveal variables that influence the outcomes of the decision as well as 
how each variable influences the outcomes. The ‘Protected/Unprotected’ example reveals 
that the detection variable alone determined if the outcome would yield a cost or a benefit 
while the other variables determined the degree of cost or benefit in the outcome. This 
determination then aids the decision maker to determine whether he can influence the 
variable and then how he can influence each variable. Central to this decision process is 
to understand risk in order to determine the decision criteria. The two strategies proposed 
were expected value and minimax. Expected value focuses decisions on maximizing 
value while minimax focuses decisions on avoiding the worst outcome. Oftentimes, the 
value of the worst outcome extends well beyond the limits of the utility scale, but 
determining the actual value of that outcome will further enhance the knowledge applied 
to a decision. The example also displayed how the option with the lowest risk does not 
always make it the best decision, which reinforces conclusions of previous chapters that 
proposed the riskiness of risk aversion. Ultimately, the decision process aids decision-
makers in identifying the components of a decision, which components are subjective and 
which components are objective, how those components affect the decision, and 




                                                 
48 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters (Carlise, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, 1983), 14. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A quick look at the extensive literature about risk reveals its sub-categories 
including risk perception and risk communication and is a testament to the vastness of the 
topic. Despite the ever-presence of risk in decisions, two people will rarely assess the risk 
of a decision in the same way. The intent of this work has been to increase the knowledge 
of risk to military decision makers who due to the nature of their decisions should be 
experts. This work was limited to defining risk and illustrating its dynamics in military 
environments and utilized various methods. 
Throughout this work it is prudent to conclude with three main points. First, the 
use of mathematical principles, economics, decision theory, and game theory is 
enormously useful in understanding risk. This methodology utilizes theoretical scenarios 
to objectively define risk. Alternative less rigorous methods make risk elusive and 
mysterious, largely conditional, and loosely defined. The methodology of this work 
depended deeply on the objective results to illuminate the subjective aspects of risk. In 
this way, two individuals with different understandings of the subject can now speak the 
same risk-language and constructively debate the subjective aspects that involve 
assigning probability.   
Second, risk aversion is very risky. This idea is vital for military leaders to 
understand. Currently, most people try not to be risk averse because they just think they 
are not supposed to be. This work has utilized economic principles to show that risk 
aversion leads to unpreparedness. The economic principles helped tightly tie the training 
and combat environment together while still respecting their differences.  
Third, the dynamics of risk all point to the importance of a decision process that 
includes determining the decision criteria, recognizing of the array of possible outcomes 
of the decision, and identifying of the variables that affect the outcomes. It is paramount 
in managing risk in irregular conflict to have “a small influence over the right variables 
than a large influence over variables that are less likely to shape the outcome of the 
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conflict.”49  Balance throughout the decision process will prevent cognitive bias rooted in 
emotions that are often the genesis of poor decisions throughout history. Many are guilty 
of thinking Pearl Harbor, an assault through the Ardennes Forest, and 9/11 were all 
impossibilities. Ultimately, the outcome of a decision is never certain, but a sound 
decision process that includes decision criteria will reveal the best decision based on the 
knowledge available.  
 
  
                                                 
49 Gordon McCormick et al., “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third 
World Quarterly, 28, no. 2 (2007): 364. 
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